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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA K. LARSEN and THE STATE 
OF UTAH, by and through UTAH 
STATE DEPART:MENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-vs-
DOUGLAS COLLINA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 18328 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Appellant (hereinafter referred to as Appellant) 
made a Motion to Set Aside Default and for Relief from Judgment 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). Appellant's 
Motion was heard on February 17, 1982, in the Third Judicial 
District Court. This is a civil appeal from the Court's Order 
denying Appellant's Motion. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant's Motion was denied by the Honorable Maurice D. 
Jones following the hearing in the Third Judicial District Court 
on February 17, 1982. The date of the Judgment Order was 
February 19, 1982. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court. 
STATE?1ENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs-Respondents (hereinafter referred to as 
Respondents) sued Appellant to establish Appellant's paternity 
of a child born out of wedlock to Respondent, Linda K. Larsen. 
Appellant filed an Answer to the Complaint denying paternity. 
Interrogatories were mailed to Appellant's former attorney, 
Bradley Parker, on Jtme 23, 1980. The Interrogatories had not 
been answered as of August, 1980, and so on August 25, 1980, 
Respondents moved the lower court for an Order striking the 
Appellant's Answer and for a Default Judgment. 
Respondents' Motion was heard on September 17, 1980, at 
which time the Court granted Appellant's former attorney 15 days 
from September 17, 1980 (i.e. until October 2, 1980) to Answer 
said Interrogatories. This Order was dated October 10, 1980. 
Appellant, Douglas Collina, was not present at the hearing held 
on September 17, 1980. 
The 15-day extension elapsed on October 2, 1980. Mr. 
Brad Parker withdrew as Appellant's cotmsel on October 15, 1980. 
Prior to the time of withdrawal, Appellant avers that he was 
never notified by his counsel that he must answer Respondents' 
Interrogatories within any time period or possibly have a Default 
Judgment entered against him. At the hearing on February 17, 1982, 
Respondents' counsel made a proffer that sometime after December 
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17, 1980, Appellant filed a Complaint against Bradley Parker, 
which was later dismissed; and, further, that Mr. Parker had 
been informed by Appellant that Appellant had received Bradley 
Parker's previous Notice of Withdrawal, which Mr. Parker had 
sent to Appellant on or shortly after October 15, 1980. 
It might be that Appellant received Mr. Parker's Notice 
of Withdrawal, but the important point for this Appeal is that 
Mr. Parker did not withdraw from counsel until sometime well 
after October 2, 1980, when the 15-day extension on the deadline 
for answering the Interrogatories in question had already expired. 
It was not shown that Mr. Parker had made any attempt at all to 
contact Appellant within the 15-day extension period. Also, 
even though the County Attorney asserted at the lower court hear-
ing that it, too, had sent out Notice to Appellant on October 21, 
1980, to obtain counsel or appear on his own behalf, this Notice 
was also sent well after the 15-day extension had expired. 
A Default Judgment was entered against Appellant on 
December 17, 1980, decreeing him to be the father of the child 
and ordering him to pay unpaid child support in the amount of 
Four Thousand Nine Hundred Forty-Six Dollars ($4,946.00) and the 
sum of One Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars ($183.00) per month as 
continuing support. 
Appellant contacted present counsel in early March of 
1981, and filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default and for Relief 
- 3 -
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of Judgment on March 17, 1981, within 90 days from the date of 
the Order. Appellant answered Respondents' Interrogatories on 
May 29, 1981, as part of negotiations to have the Default set 
aside. The parties, by oral stipulation, declined to set the 
matter for hearing pending a thorough review by the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office. The opposing cotmsel involved in the 
stipulation negotiations was replaced due to an assignment 
change, and the new counsel, in late 1981, notified Appellant's 
present counsel that it would not stipulate to setting aside 
the Default Judgment. Consequently, Appellant renewed his 
earlier Motion, a hearing was held, and the Order was entered 
from which this Appeal is being taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTION OF THE LOWER COURT IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT AND FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT WAS ARBITRARY AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b), states: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the Court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or legal representative from 
a final judgment, order, or proceedings for 
the following reasons: 
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect; or 
(2) Any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment." 
In the case of Ney v. Harrison, 5 U.2d 217, 299 P.2d 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1114, the Utah Supreme Court stated it was not abuse of discre-
tion for a trial court to relieve a defendant from a judgment 
and to allow her to answer where it was shown that she had mis-
takenly believed she was fully protected by a Divorce Decree and 
felt that such a Decree required her husband to bear the obliga-
tion of defending the action for her. An analogy can be made to 
the facts of the instant case where Appellant, Douglas Collina, 
had assumed and was led to believe that his attorney would 
undertake all the activities necessary to answer the complaint 
and interrogatories in a timely fashion. It was reasonable for 
Appellant, Douglas Collina, to rely on his attorney to do so. 
In the case of Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul 
W. Larson Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
"Where any reasonable excuse is offered by 
defaulting party, courts generally tend to favor 
granting relief from a default judgment, unless it 
appears that to do so would result in substantial 
injustice to the adverse party." 
See, also, the case of Meyhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 
376 P.2d 951, (Ut. 1962), where the Utah Supreme Court said, 
p. 952: 
- 5 -
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on a without a hearin is obviousl 
to a controvers 
present 
As the Mayhew case indicated, there is a presumption in favor of 
granting parties a full hearing on the merits and it will gener-
ally be "regarded as an ahuse of discretion to refuse to vacate 
a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or 
excuse." 
In the instant case it would be patently unfair to require 
Appellant to pay child support for eighteen years on the basis 
of his failure to answer Interrogatories, expecially since the 
blood test results do not show a very high probability that he 
was the father. The blood test results are summarized by Dr. 
C. W. DeWitt, Ph.D., of the University of Utah College of Medicine 
in a letter dated May 15, 1980, and attached hereto. Dr. DeWitt 
states: 
"Some estimate can be made of the probability 
that Mr. Collina is indeed the father. The antigen 
pRir (A30, B18) in the baby obviously comes from 
the mother. The following probabilities then are 
based on our published knowledge of the percentage 
occurrence of the antigen pair (Al, BS) in a large 
population which should contain the baby's father 
and other potential consorts. Simple statistical 
analysis then allows us to make the following 
estimates: If the mother had sexual relations with 
only one man (Mr. Collina) at the time of conception, 
- h -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
then the probability that he is the father is, of 
course, 100 percent, and blood and tissue typing 
would not be necessary. As the number of men the 
mother had sexual relations with at that time rises 
the probability that Mr. Collins is the father de- ' 
creases. This is in order of: 
Consorts 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Probability 
74% 
58% 
48% 
41% 
You realize, of course, that these are probabilities 
based on a large number of occurrences, whereas in this 
case we are dealing with one occurrence." 
As can be seen, if plaintiff, Linda K. Larsen, had sexual 
relations with only three consorts at the critical time, the 
chances of Appellant being the father are only 58 percent, just 
slightly better than fifty-fifty. This is too low a probability 
to impose eighteen years of child support on him on the basis of 
a default judgment, without even making the slightest inquiry 
into the facts of the case. Respondent may try to assert that 
there are no allegations by Appellant that Respondent, Linda K. 
Larsen, had intercourse with more than one person during the time 
period of conception, and further, that in Appellant's Answers 
to the Interrogatories Appellant stated that he did not know of 
any other consort that Respondent may have had intercourse with 
during the critical time. Appellant would respond to this as 
follows: First of all, since the Default Judgment which was 
upheld at the Hearing on February 17, 1980, was entered because 
- 7 -
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of Appellant's earlier failure to timely answer these Interrog-
atories, Respondents should not now be allowed to bring into 
evidence any answers Appellant later gave when answering said 
Interrogatories. If Respondents are allowed to bring in such 
Answers, however, let the Court consider the Interrogatory and 
the exact wording of the Answer of Appellant: 
"(Interrogatory) 37. Do you contend that co-plaintiff 
had sexual relations with any person other than 
defendant during the period December, 1975 to April, 
1976? If so, give the name and address of each such 
person. 
A. Defendant is without information to either 
admit or deny plaintiff's Interrogatory 4fo37." 
It is clear from the above Question and Answer, that Appellant did 
not admit or state the Respondent, Linda K. Larsen, had sexual 
relations with only one consort during the period of conception. 
Rather, the Appellant merely stated that he was without any know-
ledge as to what said Respondent may or may not have done during 
said time period. 
The Lower Court did recognize that communications between 
Appellant and his pervious attorney, Bradley Parker, had broken 
down, but apparently reasoned that since it was preferred that 
Appellant had received the Notice of Withdrawal which Mr. Parker 
had sent out on or after October 15, 1980, Appellant must have 
received all of Mr. Parker's earlier correspondence. This does 
not necessarily follow, however. Question No. 3 of the Interroga-
tories and its Answer are as follows: 
- 8 -
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"(Interrogatory) 3. If you have resided at any other 
address or addresses since 1975, list the addresses 
and the date of residence at each. 
A. 5/2/80 through 2/15/80, P.O. Box 517, 
Ferron, Utah. 2/1/79 through 5/2/80, 
171 North Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 3/1/75 through 2/1/79, 6641 West 
3785 South, Hunter, Utah." 
From this Answer, it is clear that Appellant did not 
reside at the Redwood Road address during the months of July, 
August, September and October of 1980. It was to the Redwood 
Road address that Bradley Parker sent his correspondence. There-
fore, even though Appella~t received the Notice of Withdrawal 
of Mr. Parker, it does not follow that he received the earlier 
notices and letters. Appellant filed an Affidavit to accompany 
his Memorandum in Support of his Motion with the lower Court. 
In his Affidavit, Appellant averred as follows: 
"l. That I was never notified by my attorney of record 
at that time, Bradley H. Parker, that I must answer 
plaintiff's Interrogatories within fifteen (15) days 
from September 15, 1980, or my answer to the complaint 
would be stricken and a default judgment entered 
against me. 
2. That an Order directing me to answer plaintiff's 
Interrogatories was made by the Court on October 10, 
1980, while I was still represented by said couns~l. 
3. That my attorney of record at that time, Bradley 
H. Parker, did n.ot file a withdrawal of counsel until 
October 15, 1980. 
4. That the fifteen days in which to answer plain-
tiff's interrogatories had lapsed prior to my counsel's 
withdrawal on October 15, 1980. 
5. That prior to my cotm.sel's withdrawal, I was never 
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notified that I must answer plaintiff's interrogatories 
or a Default Judgment would be taken against me. 
6. That I was relying on my cotmsel to inform me as to 
what needed to be done and what deadlines were to be 
met in order to defend myself against the Complaint. 
Appellant wishes to point out to this Court that his Affidavit 
was i.mopposed by either opposing Affidavits or direct testimony 
and, therefore, should be taken as true. 
In conclusion, Appellant requests this Court to reverse 
the decision of the lower Court and to allow this matter to be 
heard at trial, because to uphold the Default Judgment would be 
against the interest of justice, since it would mean that Plain-
tiff would have to pay child support for eighteen years without 
having had his day in court to establish whether or not he is in 
fact the father of the child. Admittedly, the State has an in-
terest in seeing to it that minor children are provided for, but 
this interest should not overide that of protective fathers. This 
case is similar in its facts to that of Interestate Excavating, 
Inc. v. Agla Development Corporation, 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). 
There, the Appellant's attorney withdrew from the case and cert-
ified that he had mailed a notice of the trial to Appellant. No 
one appeared at the trial on behalf of Appellant, even though the 
Respondents' attorney also certified that he, too, had mailed a 
notice of trial to Appellant. On Appeal, Appellant asserted that 
it had never received notice of trial, and that its attorney may 
have misplaced the notice of trial among numerous papers mailed 
- 10 -
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by his office at the time he withdrew. A Default Judgment 
was entered when no one appeared for Appellant at trial. 
Appellant immediately contacted new counsel when it received 
notice of Default Judgment, and the new counsel then filed 
an appeal 17 days later. (Although, Appellant in the instant 
case did not obtain new counsel immediately, he did file a 
complaint against his former attorney, Bradley Parker, in 
or about December, 1980, the month he learned of the Default 
Judgment). In Agla Development, the Court set aside the 
Default Judgment stating: 
It is not to be questioned that 
in appropriate circumstances default judg-
ments are justified; and when they are, they 
are invulnerable to attack. However, they 
are not favored in the law, especially where 
a party has timely responded with challenging 
pleadings. When that has been done some 
caution should be observed to see that the 
party is not taken advantage of. Speaking 
generally about such problems, it is to be 
kept in mind that access to the courts for 
the protection of rights and the settlement 
of disputes is one of the most important fac-
tors in the maintenance of a peaceable and 
well-ordered society. This of course must 
be done in obedience to rules; and it is to 
be conceded that there is a possibility that 
the defendant was less than diligent in attend-
ing to its interest in this lawsuit. But no 
evidence was taken, nor did the court make any 
findings other than the order denying defendant's 
motion. 
This is admittedly a perplexing case. 
From the standpoint of the plaintiff and its 
counsel, they appear to have proceeded without 
any impropriety, including appearing on the 
trial date and presenting their case. Defendant 
- 11 -
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counters with the averments that it received 
no such notice. Supportive of the defendant's 
position, are the facts that the justification 
for its default rests upon the assertion of 
service of notice by ordinary mail; and that 
immediately upon learning of the judgment, it 
proceeded diligently with efforts to set it 
aside and contest the issues on the merits. 
The uniformally acknowledged policy of 
the law is to accord l:Ltigants the opportunity 
for a hearing on the merits, where that can be 
done without serious injustice to the other 
party. To that end, the courts are generally 
indulgent toward the setting aside of default 
judgments where there is a reasonable justifi-
cation or excuse for the defendant's failure 
to appear, and where timely application is made 
to set it aside. Consistent with the objective 
just stated, where there is doubt about whether 
a default should be set aside, the doubt should 
be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end 
that each party may have an opportunity to pre-
sent his side of the controversy and that there 
be a resolution in accordance with law and justice. 
Ibid, 611 P.2d 369, 371. 
So, too, in the instant case, Appellant requests this 
Court to set aside the Default Judgment in the interests of 
justice. Appellant filed a timely answer to the complaint. 
There was no proof that Appellant ever received letters not-
ifying him of the need to answer the Interrogatories by any 
deadline, or of the 15·-day extension.. Further, the lower 
Court made no findings as to what grounds it denied Appellant's 
motion. Also, it is clear that Appellant did take immediate 
action when he learned of the Default Judgment by filing a 
Complaint with the Utah State Bar against his former attorney. 
- 12 -
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It is submitted, therefore, that this _Court should follow the 
principles laid down in the Agla Development case (supra), and 
reverse the decision of the lower Court in the instant case to 
allow Appellant to have his day in Court. 
POINT II 
THE I.DWER COURT CGt1I'trED PRE.ruDICIAL ERROR BY 
ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE A MEMORANDUM WHICH 
ARGUED THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD TESTS AND 
WHICH INCORPORATED A LETTER OF APPELLANT'S 
FORMER ATTORNEY. THE MEMORANDUM HAD NOT 
BEEN SERVED ON APPELLANT AS REQUIRED BY THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND NO PROPER 
FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR THE RESULTS OF THE 
BLOOD TESTS. 
At the lower Court hearing, the Respondent, the State 
of Utah Department of Social Services served Appellant with their 
Memorandum In Opposition to Appellant's Motion. In Respondents' 
Memorandum they argued the results of the blood tests Appellant 
had taken, even though they only had a letter from Dr. C.W. DeWitt 
of the University of Utah College of Medicine. Dr. DeWitt was 
not present to testify, nor was Dr. DeWitt's signature certified. 
Further, Respondent's brief incorporated a letter from Appellant's 
former counsel, in which it was stated that Appellant had received 
Notice of Counsel's withdrawal. 
- 13 -
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It is Appellant's position that the Court committed 
prejudicial error in allowing Respondents' Memorandum, the 
blood tests, and Bradley Parker's letter into evidence be-
cause they were only served upon Appellant at the day of the 
hearing, thus violating Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
6 (d) which states: 
(d) For Motions--Affidavits. A written motion, 
other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served 
not later than five days before the time speci-
fied for the hearing, tmless a different period 
is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. 
Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex 
parte application. When a motion is supported 
by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with 
the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in 
Rule 59 (c), opposing affidavits may be served 
not later than one day before the hearing, unless 
the court permits them to be served at some other 
time. 
Further, Respondent should not have been allowed to 
argue the results of the blood tests when no proper foundation 
had been laid. In the case of Phillips and State of Utah De-
partment of Social Services vs. Jackson, No. 15618 (Filed July 
22, 1980), this Court laid down the following requirements re-
garding the admissibility of the HLA blood factor tests into 
evidence in paternity suits: 
"Dr. DeWitt, a pathologist, was relied 
on to establish the necessary scientific found-
ation. Counsel stipulated that he is an expert, 
a practice wholly appropriate in many cases, but 
one that leaves this record devoid of evidence 
of his qualifications--evidence that is essential 
in this particular case. In a case dealing with 
the proposed admissibility of a new scientific 
test which presumably will be relied on innum-
- 14 -
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erable times in the future, the stipulation 
leaves a hiatus in the necessary foundation. 
Furthermore, this testimony does not 
supply the necessary information as to the 
general acceptance of the test, the exist-
ence of verification studies, if any, and 
the particular tests that were in fact per-
formed in this case. There is no evidence 
in the record which establishes his expert-
ise either in the theory or in the use of 
HLA testing for paternity purposes. In 
addition, there is no evidence indicating 
whether special training in pathology or 
some other field is a necessary prerequisite 
to qualify a wi.tness to testify concerning 
the test. 
Dr. DeWitt did state that the test is 
highly accurate and has been in use for some 
fifteen years, and that "the figures that we 
used to deduce the possibilities are based 
on the analysis of a large number of families." 
He further testified that the test was widely 
used "for medical purposes." The difficulty 
with this testimony is that it is too general, 
too vague, and too unrelated to the specific 
means for determining reliability. Since his 
testimony did not focus specifically on patern-
ity identification, it may and, as best as can 
be determined from the record, in fact does 
refer to other medical uses such as tissue 
compatibility for purposes of organ transplant-
ation. Furthermore, Dr. DeWitt did not indicate 
how the table of percentages used to establish 
paternity probabilities was arrived at, "were 
widely accepted" and "supported by similar work 
elsewhere done in public by other people. But 
he did not explain what he meant by "widely 
accepted" or by whom, and he did not supply any 
detail as to the work done by others. Nor does 
it appear that he had particular knowledge ob-
tained from a technical background and training 
in the area, or from familiarity with the sci-
entific literature on the subject. The general 
statement that the method is used widely and had 
wide scientific acceptance is not sufficient, 
especially in view of the fact that the test ap-
plications apparently were unrelated to paternity 
identification. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Furthermore, in order to make a proper 
determination of the advisability of admitting 
HLA test results in any given case, the found-
ational information before the court should 
include the number and type of other blood and 
tissue tests which have been administered to 
the persons involved in the litigation and the 
cumulative effect of the additional tests on 
the predictive accuracy of the HLA test. As 
stated in J.B. v. A.F., supra, 285 N.W.2d at 883: 
The mean probability of excluding 
a male who in fact is not the father 
of a child through HLA testing, alone, 
is between 78% and 80% blacks, whites, 
and Japanese. If six systems (ABO, 
Rh, MNSs, Kell, Duffy and Kidd) plus 
HLA are used, the cumulative proba-
bility of excluding a male who in 
fact is not the father of a child 
rises to 91.21% for blacks, 93.34% 
for whites and 91.42% for Japanese. 
In the instant case there is not evidence 
at all that the ABO, Rh, MNSs, Kell, Duffy of Kidd 
tests were employed, yet the percentage Dr. DeWitt 
testified to seems to assume that those tests were 
administered. It may be that there was no necess-
ity for administering these tests, but if so, the 
record must so demonstrate. 
Also, evidence should be adduced showing 
the effect, if any, of the particular racial or 
ethnic origin of the subject on the calculated 
probability of exclusion or inclusion of paternity. 
In addition, qualified witnesses should address 
the significance of the particular genetic markers 
relied upon, whether they were inherited from only 
one parent or both, and the frequency with which 
they may appear in the population at large." 
Here, none of these requirements were met. In fact, 
Dr. DeWitt was not even present at the hearing and, therefore, 
it was not even proved that he in fact was the author of the 
letter in question: 
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Moreover, since the lower Court did not make any 
findings to support its decision to deny Appellant's motion 
it is uncertain as to what its decision was based on. Appell-
any would argue, however, that the lower Court's decision 
should be reversed for the further reason that it improperly 
took into consideration the results of blood tests for which 
no proper foundation had been laid and because Respondents' 
Memorandum and supporting documents were not timely served 
on Appellant. 
POINT III 
IN THE EVENT THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS UPHELD 
THE CASE SHOULD STILL BE REMANDED TO THE LOWER 
COURT FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO DETERMINE 
HOW MUCH CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD BE AWARDED. 
In the recent case of Pitts v. Pine Meadows Ranch, 
Inc., 589 P.2d. 767 (Utah, 1978), the lower Court granted 
Respondents' judgment by Appellant when Appellant failed to 
appear on the trial date. Appellant faile4 to timely appeal 
under Utah Rules of Procedure, Rule 60 (b). Moreover, the 
Respondents' had moved out of the cot.mtry. Therefore, this 
Court held that it would not reverse the decision of the lower 
Court to not set aside the default. This Court did remand for 
a taking of further findings as to the amount of damages, how-
ever, because the lower Court had not made adequate findings 
or properly weighed the evidence as to damages (as required by 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55 (b) (2)): 
"We hold that the defendants are entitled 
to a new hearing to determine the issue of damages 
conditioned, however on the defendants paying to 
plaintiff's all of their reasonable and necessary 
expenses in returning to this jurisdiction (which 
defendants have volunteered to do) for the purpose 
of re-litigating plaintiffs' damages. This matter 
is remanded to the District Court for the purpose 
of determining the details concerning these ex-
penses, including the amotmt thereof and the period 
of time in which they are to be paid and for such 
further proceedings on the issue of damages as are 
consistent with this opinion." 
The principle enunciated above was reaffirmed in the 
case of JGP.W. Enterprises, Inc., vs. Naef, 604 P.2d. 486 
(Utah, 1979), Where this Court also upheld a default judg-
ment, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
In the instant case, the lower Court merely denied 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside and upheld the judgment of the 
lower Court which had entered judgment in favor of the State 
of Utah against Appellant in the amount of four thousand nine 
htmdred forty six dollars ($4,946.00) for unpaid child support 
from March, 1979, through December, 1979, and for ongoing child 
support in the amount of one htmdred eighty-three dollars 
($183.00) per month. This is clearly enormous in light of the 
Pine Meadows Ranch and Naef cases above, especially since the 
lower Court did not enter any findings to support the above 
amounts nor did it inquire into the earnings of the putative 
father, his ability to pay, or the needs of this particular child. 
- 18 -
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Nevertheless, if the decision of the lower Court is 
not reversed, Appellant requests that this Court remand this 
matter for an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of 
child support he should be required to pay. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, Appellant reqpectfully 
asks this Court to reverse the judgment of the lower Court and 
grant Appellant a trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
, .. 
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